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Abstract 
Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) highlight the independence between distinct metamemorial 
judgments that contribute to the experience of remembering. Initial definitions of NBMs 
portrayed them as involving the withdrawal of belief in occurrence despite sustained 
recollection. While people rate belief for their NBMs as weaker than recollection, the average 
difference is too small to support the idea that autobiographical belief is completely withdrawn in 
all cases. Furthermore, autobiographical belief and recollection ratings vary considerably across 
NBMs. In two studies, we reanalyzed data from prior studies to examine whether NBM reports 
reflect a single category or multiple sub-categories using cluster analytic methods. In Study 1, we 
identified three sub-types of NBMs. In Study 2 we incorporated the concept of belief in 
accuracy, and found that two of the clusters from Study 1 split into two clusters apiece. All 
clusters were characterized by higher recollection than belief in occurrence ratings, and clusters 
were differentiated by the degree of difference between these variables. In both studies the 
clusters were discriminated by a number of memory characteristic ratings and by reasons 
reported as leading to the alteration of belief. Implications for understanding the remembering of 
past events and predicting the creation of NBMs are discussed. 
 
Keywords: nonbelieved memory, subtype, cluster analysis, belief in occurrence, accuracy, 
memory  
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Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories 
Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) have been described as a counterintuitive phenomenon 
in which a person claims to have a vivid episodic recollection of an event, despite no longer 
believing that the event is veridical. Anecdotal reports of NBMs have been known for some time, 
but this type of memorial experience has only recently become a topic of scientific study, and 
recognized as more common than previously thought (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; see 
Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014, for a review). The purpose of this paper is to revisit the 
quality of fit between people’s reports and ratings of naturally-occurring NBMs and theoretical 
characterizations of these memories. To this end, we examine the possibility that differentiating 
sub-types of NBMs might better elucidate the circumstances in which people’s appraisals of 
belief in occurrence and recollection about remembered events are revised. 
Researchers interested in NBMs have found them relatively easy to observe in everyday 
experience, and easy to create artificially in the laboratory. As a consequence, several studies 
have been conducted that collectively reveal some typical characteristics of NBMs. First, when 
people report having ceased believing a memory, this belief-change frequently follows the 
receipt of some form of social feedback (in about half of reports; Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 
2015). Individuals also report altering belief due to reappraisal of the plausibility of events, 
attributing events to a source other than memory, internal recollective characteristics (e.g, a 
memory is “fuzzy”), external details (e.g., photographs), general metacognitive beliefs about 
remembering, attributions about the self or others, and personal motivations to alter belief. 
Second, the phenomenological characteristics of NBMs are in many ways similar to those 
associated with (believed) episodic recollection (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Rubin, 
Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). For instance, in both survey-based and laboratory studies, 
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participants rate believed and nonbelieved memories similarly with respect to their perceptual 
detail, spatial detail, and the sense of re-experiencing the past (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & 
Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013; Scoboria et 
al., 2014; Scoboria & Talarico, 2013; Scoboria & Pascal, in press). However, in some studies 
participants have judged their NBMs to have less narrative coherence than do their believed 
memories, and to be less connected within memory networks, less personally important, and to 
signify less-plausible events. Recognizing the existence and characteristics of NBMs has 
provided strong evidence on which to advance novel arguments about an important theoretical 
distinction in autobiographical remembering: between recollection on the one hand, and belief in 
occurrence on the other. Before elaborating a rationale for considering sub-types of NBM, we 
will first pause to define and briefly discuss these key dimensions of the investigation. 
Recollection 
Recollection involves mentally reinstating the perceptual, temporal, or spatial 
characteristics of past experiences, and combining this mental simulation with a sense of re-
experiencing the past (Brewer, 1996; Tulving, 1983). See Rubin and Umanath (2015) for a 
related view on the nature of mental simulation. It is this combination of mental simulation and 
recapitulation that is unique to episodic recollection (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009), 
and so mental simulations not accompanied by a sense of re-experiencing tend instead to be 
attributed to other sources of mental experience, such as imagination (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). Recollection judgments are therefore metacognitive appraisals of certain 
qualities that may be associated with mental representations, but importantly, are just one of a 
number of metacognitive judgments that contribute to the experience of remembering the past 
(Rubin, 2006; Scoboria et al., 2014).  
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Belief in occurrence (Autobiographical belief) 
A second metacognitive judgment implicated in remembering the past is belief in 
occurrence: a broad judgment that an event genuinely occurred to the self in the past. These 
judgments are typically made with reference to the evidence that is available (Scoboria et al., 
2014), and are therefore highly sensitive to the retrieval context, in particular social feedback 
(Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999; Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 
2007; Scoboria, Wysman, & Otgaar, 2012). Belief in occurrence judgments are much more 
responsive to social feedback than are recollection judgments, which serves as one piece of 
evidence that the two must be rooted in distinct underlying processes (Mazzoni et al., 2014; 
Scoboria et al., 2014). 
Prior to the growth of research on NBMs, it was commonly thought that belief in 
occurrence was a necessary but not sufficient precondition for recollection – that is, people 
should not always need to recollect events in order to believe those events occurred, yet they 
should always need to believe the events occurred in order to recollect them (Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004). To the contrary, the existence of NBMs demonstrates that these two 
metacognitive judgments are in fact distinct and fully dissociable, a proposition that has since 
been empirically verified (Scoboria et al., 2014). Despite this dissociability, though, it is 
noteworthy that the experience of recollection may still influence belief in occurrence 
considerably, as it is likely that people often infer belief in occurrence from the strength of 
recollection (Scoboria et al., 2004). 
How ‘nonbelieved’ and ‘memory-like’ are nonbelieved memories? 
Mazzoni et al. (2010) described NBMs as “vivid autobiographical memories for events 
that people no longer believe happened to them” (p. 1334). Similarly, Scoboria et al.’s (2014) 
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discussion of NBMs included phrases such as “stopped believing” and “withdrawal of belief” (p. 
3). If these descriptions are correct, then participants who appraise their NBMs should reliably 
provide high ratings of recollection and low ratings of belief in occurrence. The empirical 
evidence is not clearly in line with this assertion. In Scoboria et al. (2014), participants’ average 
recollection ratings for naturally-occurring NBMs were reliably higher than their belief in 
occurrence ratings; yet their recollection ratings were not at the scale ceiling (M ~ 5.2 on the 7-
point scale), nor were their belief in occurrence ratings at the scale floor (M ~ 3.5). In contrast, 
when participants appraised believed memories, their recollection ratings were close to the scale 
ceiling, reliably higher than their recollection ratings for NBMs. These findings were replicated 
in the two studies reported by Scoboria and Pascal (in press). 
Thus believed and nonbelieved memories may differ after all in terms of recollection, not 
just in terms of belief in occurrence. Indeed, in experimental lab studies where participants 
receive disconfirming social feedback about their memories, this feedback reduces not just 
participants’ ratings of belief in occurrence, but also to a lesser extent their ratings of 
recollection. These findings necessitate some softening in the characterization of NBMs. For 
example, Scoboria, Talarico, and Pascal (2015) more conservatively defined NBMs as instances 
in which “the strength of recollection exceeds that of autobiographical belief” (p. 338). 
Furthermore, these findings also raise the possibility that research on NBMs to date may in fact 
have captured very few NBMs that meet Mazzoni et al.’s (2010) definition, whereby recollection 
is strong but belief in occurrence is weak. If this were the case, then one possible implication 
could be that this kind of NBM is actually rare, as was previously thought to be the case.   
Whereas previous research has focused generally on characterizing average NBMs, no 
research has looked closely at the variability between NBMs. Scoboria (2013) proposed that 
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when people encounter evidence that contradicts vivid memories, different outcomes can occur: 
sometimes belief is completely relinquished, sometimes belief is partially reduced, and 
sometimes belief is not altered at all. The data from lab studies concur with this proposal insofar 
that disconfirming evidence does not always lead people to fully, or even partially, abandon 
belief in occurrence (Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni et al., 2014). Moreover, there is ample evidence 
outside the lab that people sometimes ‘defend’ memory claims in spite of contrary evidence. 
Sheen, Kemp, and Rubin (2001), for instance, discuss cases in which identical twins each claim 
that a remembered experience happened to themselves and not to the other sibling.  
Hence it is entirely unsurprising to discover variability in the extent to which challenges 
affect belief in events’ occurrence. Indeed, the same variability emerges in lab studies where 
researchers have used suggestion to create false beliefs and memories. In those studies, 
participants do not believe the target event occurred to them at the start of the procedure. In 
response to suggestive procedures, some participants come to show substantial increases in belief 
ratings, while others show small increases in belief ratings, and others show no increases at all 
(Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 2007; Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
Jarry, & Shapero, 2012). Some of the earliest studies on the formation of rich false memories 
took the view that suggestions sometime result in “partial” and sometimes “complete” false 
recollection (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995), a concept revisited in a recent mega-analysis 
of false-memory implantation studies (Scoboria et al., 2016). Whereas it has been valuable to 
study the conditions under which suggestions lead people to develop false autobiographical 
beliefs of varying strength, it is also valuable to consider the conditions under which 
disconfirming feedback affects autobiographical beliefs, to greater or lesser extents.  
Are nonbelieved memories a unitary phenomenon? 
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Because people’s ratings of belief in occurrence and recollection vary substantially for 
NBMs, it seems possible that naturally-occurring NBMs are not a unitary phenomenon. In this 
paper we explore whether NBM reports are best grouped together into one single category, or 
whether they are better explained using multiple categories. Examining distinct clusters of 
NBMs has the potential to shed light on differential factors that influence people’s decision-
making about vivid memories, and to point to distinct underlying processes. For example, 
assuming that distinct clusters can be reliably identified, what variables might discriminate 
between these clusters? In two studies, we asked whether any clusters, defined based on patterns 
of belief and recollection judgments, might be distinguishable in terms of recollective 
characteristics (e.g., visual, spatial), narrative coherence, event importance, event plausibility, 
and connectedness. Furthermore, we asked whether the different social or cognitive processes 
that lead to the full or partial withdrawal of belief might distinguish clusters of NBMs. 
The literature points to distinct types of NBMs that might be found. The first is the kind 
originally described by Mazzoni et al. (2010) and discussed above, which is characterized by 
high recollection ratings accompanied by low ratings of belief in occurrence. Such memories 
would reflect a relinquishment of belief, and so we should expect them to be distinguished by 
strong recollective characteristics, perhaps combined with a report of discovering compelling 
disconfirming evidence. A second NBM-type should reflect the partial reduction of belief, with 
high recollection ratings but only slightly lower ratings of belief in occurrence. These NBMs 
might be particularly likely in instances where the disconfirming evidence is weaker and does 
not substantially outweigh the strength of episodic recollection, yet nevertheless creates a degree 
of doubt. A third type of NBM might involve low ratings of belief in occurrence, and ratings of 
recollection that are also low albeit higher than belief in occurrence. Such NBMs could occur 
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when a recollection is naturally weak and so appraised as unreliable, and/or when encountering 
disconfirming evidence about a relatively strong memory has undermined both belief in 
occurrence and recollection. It is not possible to distinguish these two types of memories based 
on retrospective reports alone (i.e., to know whether a weak memory is not believed simply 
because it is weak, or whether it has become weaker after exposure to disconfirming feedback); 
nevertheless either of these forms of memory might emerge as a distinct cluster among 
participants’ reports. In the two studies reported here, we explored the variability among reports 
of naturally-occurring NBMs, using cluster analytic techniques to address whether any of these 
predicted clusters might be empirically distinguishable. 
Study 1 
Method 
In Study 1, we combined data from Scoboria et al.’s (2014, Study 2, N = 182), and 
Scoboria, Memon, Gawrylowicz, and Clark’s (2015, N = 138) surveys of naturally-occurring 
NBMs. The first dataset sampled Canadian university students using an online survey. The 
second dataset sampled Mechanical Turk workers, again using an online survey. The 
demographic characteristics of the combined sample used here (N = 320) were: 61.5% female, 
37.2% male, 1.2% of non-binary gender; Mage = 31.48, SD = 8.14, range = 17-72. 
Aside from differences in how the two samples were recruited, the online survey was 
identical for both samples. Individuals were first provided with a definition of NBMs, and asked 
whether they had such a memory. Those who indicated that they did were invited to complete the 
survey. Participants described the event in their memory, and dated when it ostensibly occurred. 
They also described when and why they altered their belief in the memory, dated when this 
change in belief occurred, and they rated the NBM on (1) belief in occurrence, (2) recollection, 
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and (3) additional memory characteristics. After providing these data about their NBM, they also 
described and rated a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event that were from 
approximately the same age as the event in the NBM. 
Measures 
Belief in occurrence. The three scale-items from Scoboria et al. (2014) were used to 
measure belief in the occurrence of events. These items used 7-point scales to assess judgments 
of the likelihood of event occurrence, strength of belief that the event occurred, and the truth of 
whether the event occurred. 
Recollection. The three scale-items from Scoboria et al. (2014) were used to measure 
recollection. The items used 7-point scales to assess judgments of memory for the event, strength 
of memory, and remembering rather than knowing the details of the event. 
Memory characteristics. Additional self-report items served as indicators of the 
phenomenological qualities of recollection. These items are variants of those described by 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988), Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2001), and 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004). Single items assessed visual detail, personal 
importance, narrative coherence, connectedness of the event to other events in memory, and the 
personal plausibility of events. Three items assessed spatial characteristics associated with the 
event (location, object, setting), and two items assessed re-experiencing (reliving, mental time 
travel); the items for spatial characteristics and those for re-experiencing were separately 
averaged to create two scale scores. The spatial characteristics and re-experiencing scales both 
demonstrated high internal consistency, with scale alphas at or above .74. Participants rated all 
items using 7-point scales except for plausibility, which they rated using an 8-point scale. 
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Reasons for altering belief. All NBMs were coded using the system described by 
Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015), which differentiates the reasons participants give for 
altering belief in their memory. The coding system comprises eight primary categories of reasons 
(social feedback, event plausibility, alternative attributions, general beliefs about memory, 
internal evidence, external evidence, alternate attributions, views of self/others, personal 
motivation). Most categories have additional sub-categories, and each individual NBM may be 
coded into more than one of these categories or sub-categories. The most complex category is 
social feedback, which contains three sub-categories (direct social contradiction, lack of 
corroboration, socially motivated invalidation). A brief description of each major category and 
sub-category from their paper is provided in Table 1. To code the narratives, two raters were 
trained and practiced rating unrelated transcripts. The raters then applied the coding system to 
the total body of reports, resulting in good agreement (kappas ranging from .82 to .99 by 
category). Disagreements were resolved via discussion. 
Results 
Cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is primarily an exploratory data mining procedure (but 
see Study 2 for our approach to confirming the cluster solution identified in Study 1). Briefly, 
cluster analysis works by seeking to group together cases that are similar, while simultaneously 
identifying differences between distinct groups of cases. This is accomplished by calculating 
estimates of within- and between-group linkages, which can be accomplished in a variety of 
manners depending on the type of algorithm that is applied.  
We used a combination of hierarchical and K-means approaches to clustering the data, 
using SPSS v23. We entered the six key items (3 indexing belief in occurrence, 3 indexing 
recollection) to explore cluster solutions. We began with hierarchical analysis, which emphasizes 
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the connectivity between cases and distance between potential clusters, and permits exploring 
how many clusters might reasonably be present in the data. We used the Squared Euclidian 
measure and both the between-groups linkage and Ward methods to extract clusters. 
Examination of the resulting dendograms (a graphical depiction of the maximum distances 
needed to connect cases into clusters) suggested that between three and eight clusters were 
potentially present. We then conducted a series of K-means cluster analyses, in which the 
algorithm seeks to assign all cases to a number of specified clusters. We produced solutions 
ranging from three to eight clusters. We examined between-cluster and within-cluster distance 
measures, and chose the three cluster solution as the most parsimonious solution that produced 
distinct groups. A second component of the analytic plan was to seek to confirm the cluster 
solution in an independent dataset; this step is reported in Study 2 below. 
The number of cases assigned to each cluster ranged from 106 to 117, indicating that 
each cluster was well represented in the dataset. Average belief in occurrence and recollection 
ratings by cluster are provided in Figure 1. Per the 95% CIs depicted on the figure, all three 
clusters were characterized by belief in occurrence ratings that were statistically lower on 
average than recollection ratings. Thus the data upheld the general notion that belief in 
occurrence is reduced to some extent relative to recollection. Newly observed here is that the 
difference between belief in occurrence and recollection varies across NBM sub-types. 
 Cluster 1 was characterized by moderate recollection ratings that fell on average slightly 
below the scale mid-point, and by belief in occurrence ratings that were meaningfully lower than 
the recollection ratings (Mdiff = 0.89, 95% CIdiff = [0.66, 1.12]; d = 0.79). Interpretation of this 
cluster is complicated by the observation made previously, namely that it is impossible to 
determine retrospectively whether these memories were weak prior to the development of the 
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NBM, became weaker after the belief in occurrence was undermined, or both. Therefore we must 
consider both possibilities when interpreting this cluster, which we labeled “Weak NBMs”.  
Cluster 2 matched prior descriptions of NBMs in the literature, as characterized by strong 
recollection associated with substantially lower autobiographical belief. Here, recollection 
ratings were close on average to the scale ceiling, and autobiographical belief ratings fell well 
below the scale mid-point. The average mean difference between belief in occurrence and 
recollection was 3.49 (95% CIdiff = [3.26, 3.71]; d = 3.04). We labeled the cases in Cluster 2 as 
“Classic NBMs”. 
 The recollection ratings for Cluster 3 were similar to those made for Classic NBMs. 
However, belief in occurrence ratings were substantially higher in Cluster 3, albeit these ratings 
still remained statistically lower than the recollection ratings (Mdiff = 0.39, 95% CIdiff = [0.18, 
0.61]; d = 0.36). This cluster appeared to represent cases in which belief in the event has been 
brought into question, but not substantially undermined. Given that for believed memories, belief 
in occurrence ratings typically exceed recollection ratings (and indeed this was true in this 
study), this cluster supports the assertion that the choice to rate belief lower than recollection to 
any degree is meaningful. We labeled the cases in Cluster 3 as “Grain of Doubt NBMs”. 
 Predicting the clusters. We next explored whether any of the additional variables might 
help to differentiate and describe the three clusters. Due to differences in item scaling, we 
examined the (continuous) self-report ratings of memory characteristics, and the (dichotomous, 
absent/present) coded reasons for withdrawing belief separately. 
 Memory characteristics. Average ratings by cluster for the eight continuous memory 
characteristic items are provided in Figure 2 (visual detail, spatial detail, re-experiencing, 
rehearsal, coherence, connectedness, significance, plausibility). Differences between clusters for 
SUB-TYPES OF NONBELIEVED MEMORIES… 14 
 
each item can be ascertained by examining the confidence intervals. We also conducted a 
discriminant function analysis with these eight variables to determine which, if any, reliably 
distinguished the three groups. Both of the resulting functions differentiated the groups; Function 
1, Wilks’ Lambda = .57, χ2 (16) = 182.24, p < .001; Function 2, Wilks’ Lambda = .83, χ2 (7) = 
62.98, p < .001. The resulting structure matrix and group centroids are provided in Table 2. The 
first function discriminated Grain of Doubt NBMs (Cluster 3) from Weak and Classic NBMs 
(Clusters 1 and 2, respectively); Grain of Doubt NBMs were characterized by higher plausibility 
ratings compared with the other two clusters. Function 2 discriminated Weak NBMs from the 
other two clusters; Weak NBMs were characterized by lower visual, spatial, re-experiencing, and 
rehearsal ratings. Ratings of coherence, significance, and connectedness did not differentiate the 
clusters. 
Reasons for withdrawing belief. We entered each of the categories as dichotomous 
(absent/present) covariates in a multinomial regression to predict differences between clusters; 
endorsement rates by cluster are reported in Table 3. Four items differentiated the clusters: 
references to subjective plausibility, references to being told that the event did not occur, 
references to inability to obtain corroboration, and references to the memory being inconsistent 
with images of other people. Specifically, participants with Grain of Doubt NBMs less 
frequently mentioned subjective plausibility (Cluster 3; 20.5%) than did those in the other two 
clusters (37.0%) (C1 v. C3, Wald = 10.48, Exp(B) = 2.74 [1.49, 5.06], p < .001; C2 v. C3, Wald 
= 12.05, Exp(B) = 3.07 [1.63, 5.79], p = .018). Being told by another person that the event did 
not occur was also mentioned less frequently by those individuals with Grain of Doubt NBMs 
(15.3%) than in the other two clusters (24.7%), (C1 v. C3, Wald = 10.48, Exp(B) = 2.74 [1.49, 
5.06], p < .001; C2 v. C3, Wald = 12.05, Exp(B) = 3.07 [1.63, 5.79], p = .018). References to 
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inability to obtain social corroboration was mentioned more frequently by those with Classic 
NBMs (21%) than by those with Grain of doubt NBMs (7%), (Wald = 6.05, Exp(B) = 2.92 [1.24, 
6.85], p = .014). Finally, references to information not being consistent with images of others 
were made more often by those with Weak NBMs (13%) than in the other clusters (4%), (C1 v. 
C2, Wald = 4.73, Exp(B) = 3.55 [1.13, 11.14], p = .030; C1 v. C3, Wald = 5.65, Exp(B) = 2.92 
[1.24, 6.85], p = .014). 
Together, the results of Study 1 show that while nonbelieved memories are characterized 
by recollection ratings that exceed belief in occurrence ratings, three distinct sub-types of NBMs 
may exist. These sub-types differ systematically, not only in terms of the strength of recollection 
and of belief in occurrence, but also in terms of their recollective qualities, and in terms of the 
factors that influenced the full or partial withdrawal of belief. Although identifying these sub-
types therefore gives us new evidence that NBMs are not a unitary phenomenon, our data also 
support the occurrence of NBMs even as they were originally defined. 
Study 2 
The results of Study 1 show that while nonbelieved memories are characterized by 
recollection ratings that exceed belief in occurrence ratings, three distinct types of NBMs 
emerge. However, the data reviewed to this point might conceal a more complex picture in terms 
of varieties of NBM. In their review of reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid memories, 
Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015) documented that some individuals describe altering 
belief because somebody told them that the event never occurred, whereas others alter belief 
because somebody told them that their memory for certain details was incorrect. The first kind of 
feedback would seem to primarily target belief in occurrence (i.e., the truth status of the entire 
event) and would likely be well represented by the clusters identified in Study 1. The second 
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kind of feedback, however, would target a different metacognitive judgment not explored in 
Study 1: belief in the accuracy of recollected information. 
Incorporating belief in accuracy 
Much of the discussion in the literature on NBMs has focussed on the distinction between 
belief in occurrence and episodic recollection. However, belief in occurrence is not the only 
appraisal of veridicality present for autobiographical event representations. Rubin (2006) has 
theorized that appraisals of memory accuracy arise out of cognitive processes that are distinct 
from those that produce recollection. A body of research demonstrates that appraisals of 
recollection and appraisals of the accuracy of recollection are empirically distinct (Rubin et al., 
2003; Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012), and indeed that both appraisals are empirically distinct 
from appraisals of belief in occurrence (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015; Scoboria & Pascal, 
in press). 
Given these developments, it is important that ideas about belief in the accuracy of events 
are incorporated into thinking about NBMs. To date, the discussion of belief in accuracy has 
been scant in the context of NBMs. Scoboria and Pascal (in press) reported that ratings of belief 
in accuracy for naturally-occurring NBMs averaged around the mid-point of the rating scale, 
similarly to belief in occurrence ratings. In other words, just like belief in occurrence, belief in 
accuracy ratings are not reduced to the scale floor, and vary across participants. Thus the same 
arguments made above about variability in belief in occurrence ratings can be applied when 
incorporating belief in accuracy into discussion of NBMs.  
In short, people with NBMs may be reporting changes to belief in occurrence and/or 
changes to belief in accuracy. It is therefore interesting to examine what recollective 
characteristics, and what types of disconfirming information, are associated with 
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change/withdrawal of belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, or both. In Study 2, we examined 
a dataset of NBMs similar to those used in Study 1, except that each memory was rated on belief 
in accuracy, as well as on recollection and belief in occurrence. We predicted that each cluster of 
NBMs from Study 1 would split into two or more sub-clusters, distinguished in terms of high vs. 
low belief in accuracy. In particular we expected that this would be true for the “classic” NBMs 
from Study 1, for in which recollection ratings were high but belief in occurrence ratings were 
low. Whereas we would typically expect these Classic NBMs to be accompanied by low belief in 
accuracy; however, a cluster of Classic NBMs in which belief in accuracy remains high might 
also exist, encompassing cases for example of “borrowed memories” (see Brown et al., 2015). In 
these cases a person recalls an event and is able to corroborate the details, and yet also discovers 
that they had not truly been present, and instead had learned the details from another person. In a 
similar manner, we predicted that Cluster 3 from Study 1 – in which both recollection and belief 
in occurrence were rated high – would split into two further clusters, one of which would involve 
low ratings of belief in accuracy, and the other would involve high ratings of belief in accuracy. 
In the present study, we again asked whether any such clusters of NBMs might be discriminable 
based on recollective characteristics, or the reasons for changing/withdrawing belief. 
Method 
In Study 2 we analyzed the data from Scoboria and Pascal (in press, Study 1), which were 
collected online using Mechanical Turk. The sample used here included all individuals from that 
dataset who provided a useable NBM (N = 308). Demographic information was provided by 296 
individuals: 49% female, 50% male, 1% of non-binary gender; Mage = 35.28, SD = 12.24, Range 
= 18-82; self-identified race/ethnicity: 3.4% Asian, 5.7% black, 13.0% mixed, 6.1% Hispanic 
origin, 81.2% white. Almost all (99.3%) reported living in the United States. 
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The procedure used to obtain the data was identical to Study 1, with one difference. After 
describing and dating the NBM, participants were also asked to describe how the loss of the 
memory affected them personally (this information is not discussed in the current paper). 
Participants then continued to rate the NBM. 
Measures. The same items as in Study 1 were used to measure belief in occurrence, 
recollection, and recollective characteristics, with the addition of the belief in accuracy items 
described below. The same coding system was applied to categorize participants’ reasons for 
withdrawing belief; kappas for all categories were reasonable (.79 to .98 by category). 
Belief in accuracy. The three highest loading items from Scoboria, Talarico, and Pascal 
(2015, Study 2) were used to assess belief in accuracy. Using 7-point scales, these items queried 
judgments of confidence that the memory is accurate, proportion of the memory that is accurate, 
and doubts about the accuracy of the memory. 
Study 2 Results 
Cluster analysis. We first sought to confirm the findings from Study 1 using this 
different dataset. We conducted a K-means cluster analysis using the same six items as in Study 
1 (3 belief in occurrence, 3 recollection), assuming that three clusters would result. The pattern 
of belief in occurrence and recollection ratings for the three resulting groups closely resembled 
the pattern reported in Study 1 (see Figure 3). Cluster 1 was once again comprised of weaker 
overall reports, with belief in occurrence ratings that were lower than recollection ratings (Mdiff = 
0.28, 95% CIdiff = [0.03, 0.53], d = 0.29). Cluster 2 was characterized by strong recollection and 
weaker belief in occurrence (Mdiff = 3.48, 95% CIdiff = [3.27, 3.69], d = 4.31). Cluster 3 included 
cases for which belief was higher, but remained statistically lower than recollection (Mdiff = 0.50, 
95% CIdiff = [0.23, 0.76]; d = 0.54). 
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Incorporating belief in accuracy. We then added the three belief in accuracy items to 
the clustering models to explore whether a sub-division of the three clusters and/or novel clusters 
would emerge. We approached clustering in two manners. First, we used three separate K-means 
cluster analyses to explore if each of the three clusters described previously were best described 
as being comprised of one or two clusters. We entered the nine key items (three belief in 
occurrence, three recollection, three belief in analyses) within each cluster separately. We found 
that Clusters 2 and 3 split into two clusters apiece that were differentiated notably by belief in 
accuracy ratings. The two clusters that resulted when examining Cluster 1 were substantially 
similar, and we therefore retained a single cluster. 
In a second set of K-means analyses, we explored cluster solutions using the nine items 
that ranged between three and six clusters. The five cluster solution closely resembled the 
solution described in the preceding paragraph. Due to the convergence in solutions between the 
two clustering approaches, we selected five clusters as a reasonable description of the data in 
Study 2. Average belief in occurrence, recollection and belief in accuracy ratings for the 
resulting five clusters are provided in Figure 4. Average ratings for believed memories and 
believed-not-remembered events across participants in the sample are also provided in Figure 4 
for the purposes of comparison. 
Clusters 2.1 and 2.2 both resembled the Classic NBM Cluster from Study 1, in that 
recollection ratings were high and belief in occurrence ratings low. Belief in accuracy ratings 
differed between these clusters. In Cluster 2.1 belief in accuracy was rated at a low level similar 
to belief in occurrence. The pattern in this cluster indicated strong recollection with substantial 
reductions in both types of belief. In Cluster 2.2 belief in accuracy was rated at a high level 
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similar to recollection. The pattern for this cluster indicated reduced belief in occurrence in the 
presence of sustained recollection and belief in the accuracy of recollected details. 
 Clusters 3.1 and 3.2 both resembled the Grain of doubt NBM Cluster from Study 1, in 
that belief in occurrence ratings were relatively high, but remained statistically lower than 
recollection ratings. In Cluster 3.1, belief in accuracy ratings were high and similar to 
recollection ratings. In Cluster 3.2, belief in accuracy ratings were notably lower than both belief 
in occurrence and recollection.  
 Memory characteristics. Average ratings for the continuous memory characteristic items 
by cluster are provided in Figure 5. Ratings for believed memories and believed-not-remembered 
events are included, for the purpose of comparison. We conducted a discriminant function 
analysis with the eight continuous variables to determine which, if any, reliably distinguished the 
five clusters. The first two functions differentiated the groups; Function 1 Wilks’ Lambda = .37, 
χ2 (32) = 300.85, p < .001; Function 2 Wilks’ Lambda = .60, χ2 (21) = 151.44, p < .001. The third 
and fourth functions did not reach statistical significance, and are not reported further. The 
resulting structure matrix and group centroids are in Table 4. The first function reflected 
plausibility ratings, which were highest for Clusters 3.1 and 3.2, moderate for Cluster 1, and 
lowest for Clusters 2.1 and 2.2. Function 2 discriminated Cluster 1 from the other clusters; 
Cluster 1 was characterized by lower ratings of visual and spatial detail. 
We next examined whether any of the items discriminated between the sub-divisions in 
Clusters 2 and 3. Clusters 2.1 and 2.2 showed similar ratings across the items, with the single 
exception of lower coherence ratings in C2.1. Cluster 3.1 showed higher visual, spatial, and re-
experiencing ratings than Cluster 3.2. Also interesting, ratings for Cluster 3.1 were higher than 
believed memories for these same three items. Thus the cluster of NBMs that was associated 
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with strong recollection and belief in accuracy showed particularly strong recollective 
characteristics. 
Reasons for withdrawing belief. Endorsement by cluster is provided in Table 5. To 
examine the replicability of the findings from Study 1, we first conducted multinomial regression 
analyses to predict the three cluster solution using the variables identified in Study 1 (subjective 
plausibility, told event did not occur, lack of corroboration). Subjective plausibility was 
statistically associated with cluster membership (C1 v. C2, Wald = 10.66, Exp(B) = 5.29 [1.95, 
14.36], p < .001; C2 v. C3, Wald = 5.57, Exp(B) = 2.82 [1.19, 6.68], p = .018). In Cluster 2, 
22.1% of participants made reference to subjective plausibility, as compared to 7.7% in the other 
groups. Inconsistency with images of others was also associated with cluster membership (C1 v. 
C2, Wald = .95, Exp(B) = 0.16 [0.63, 4.0], p = .331; C2 v. C3, Wald = 4.87, Exp(B) = 3.34 
[1.16, 9.66], p = .026). In Cluster 2, 14% of participants made reference to inconsistency with 
images of others, as compared to 5% in Cluster 3.  
Examination of the five cluster solution revealed that the finding for subjective 
plausibility extended to the sub-classification (Cluster 2.1, 25%; Cluster 2.2, 22%). Those in 
Cluster 2 consistently made more references to the subjective plausibility of the event across the 
studies as a basis for deciding to alter belief in the memory. However, whereas in Study 1 
subjective plausibility was mentioned in Cluster 2 approximately as often as in Cluster 1, here in 
Study 2 the proportion in Cluster 2 was also significantly greater than in Cluster 3. Individuals in 
Cluster 2.1 (but not Cluster 2.2) made more references to inconsistency with images of others 
compared to both of the Cluster 3 groups (17% vs. 5%).   
 We then explored whether any of the reason for altering belief discriminated between the 
sub-divisions in Clusters 2 and 3. Two items did discriminate between Cluster 2.1 and Cluster 
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2.2 (the Classic NBMs): Told impossible (Wald = 6.92, Exp(B) = 9.60 [1.78, 51.75], p =. 009; 
C2.1: 7.4%, C2.2: 25.0%); and Objective plausibility (Wald = 4.90, Exp(B) = 6.58 [1.24, 34.88], 
p = .027; C2.1: 18.8% vs. C2.2: 3.7%). Objective plausibility was the only variable that 
discriminated between Cluster 3.1 and Cluster 3.2 (Grain of doubt NBMs), (Wald = 6.81, Exp(B) 
= 31.56 [2.36, 422.09]; C3.1: 22.7% vs. C3.2: 3.4%).  
General Discussion 
 These studies revealed that there are a number of distinct outcomes that result when 
memories are brought into question and become NBMs. In Study 1 we discovered three distinct 
types of NBMs. In Study 2 these same kinds of NBM emerged once again, and two of the three 
were further sub-divided in terms of belief in the accuracy of the recalled details. Each of the 
different kinds of NBM had interesting hallmarks, which we discuss shortly, but it is important 
to also note that they all shared some commonalities. First, all types were characterized by belief 
in occurrence that is weaker than recollection (Scoboria et al., 2014). Second, as per the findings 
from many prior studies, all types were richer than believed-not-remembered events in terms of 
several subjective characteristics such as visual and spatial details, and the sense of re-
experiencing the past (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2010). Third, all types were most commonly 
accompanied by verbal descriptions of having been challenged by some kind of social source 
(Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni, 2015). Together these studies show us that many of the 
characteristics thus far believed to be defining features of NBMs are indeed robust, even despite 
there being wide variation between NBMs and their causes. 
Despite these common features, across our datasets the difference between ratings of 
belief in occurrence and of recollection for NBMs ranged considerably, from large to fairly 
small. When the differences were large (i.e., the ‘Classic NBMs’, compatible with a clear 
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“withdrawal” of autobiographical belief), these NBMs were comparable in most respects to 
believed memories, and had typically been challenged by some form of social influence. 
However, the Classic NBMs were also more likely than other NBM-types to have been 
challenged in terms of their plausibility. The evidence of these queries over plausibility was 
indexed both in participants’ memory characteristic ratings, and in their verbal descriptions of 
the reasons that led them to question the memory. Plausibility challenges therefore seem to be 
associated with the formation of Classic NBMs more often than the other kinds, in which belief 
in occurrence is undermined to a lesser extent. 
Another kind of NBM was characterized by strong recollection, but only slightly 
weakened belief in occurrence. These ‘Grain of doubt’ NBMs have previously received little 
attention in this literature, although their existence is unsurprising given that (a) the average 
NBM in Scoboria et al.’s (2014) work did not involve an entire withdrawal of belief in 
occurrence, and (b) memories are sometimes defended rather than abandoned, even in spite of 
contrary evidence. It is interesting that belief in occurrence ratings were reliably lower than 
recollection ratings for such Grain of doubt NBMs even though the difference was small. For 
believed memories, belief in occurrence ratings typically equal or exceed recollection ratings; the 
current studies therefore reinforce the notion that people’s choice to rate belief in occurrence 
lower than recollection to any degree (even one point lower) indicates that decision making 
processes related to the truth status of the event have occurred (see Scoboria & Talarico, 2013).  
The Weak NBMs, unsurprisingly, were weaker than believed memories across the range 
of subjective characteristics, albeit also stronger than believed-not-remembered events in most 
respects. These memories are more complex than the other kinds to interpret, as we have already 
noted. These cases may reflect memories that were weak even prior to becoming NBMs, or they 
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may reflect cases in which both belief in occurrence and recollection have been undermined. In 
this instance, future work is needed to differentiate instances in which recollection is retained 
versus undermined in response to evidence about the event. Such work would inevitably require 
memories to be probed and tracked across multiple time-points, to track the dynamic shifts in 
metamemory appraisals before and after challenges.  
 This paper also advances understanding of the relationship of belief in accuracy 
judgments to NBMs. The results indicate that both Classic NBMs and Grain of doubt NBMs can 
be sub-divided based on relatively high or low belief in accuracy ratings. Within the Classic 
NBMs, cases that were characterized by lower belief in accuracy were judged by participants to 
be less coherent than were those characterized by higher belief in accuracy. They were also more 
commonly accompanied by reports of having been told that the event was impossible. For the 
Grain of doubt NBMs, the cluster characterized by lower belief in accuracy was associated with 
lower visual, spatial, and re-experiencing ratings, as compared with the cluster characterized by 
higher belief in accuracy, and the verbal reports for the former cluster more often contained 
verbal reports concerning objective implausibility. 
While it is somewhat expected that belief in accuracy is linked with the recollective 
qualities of the remembered event, these data also suggest that the objective plausibility of events 
and social influence interact with other characteristics in determining the level of belief in 
accuracy for NBMs. It is interesting to notice also that the Weak NBM cluster did not split into 
two clusters when belief in accuracy was added to the analyses. This variable was rated at the 
same level as belief in occurrence and recollection, indicating that these memories are probably 
of relatively poor quality overall. One possibility to explore in future studies is whether the 
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relatively low recollective quality might a determinant of the low belief in occurrence and 
accuracy. 
This paper, which examines exclusively spontaneous NBMs, supports the conclusion that 
future work is needed to examine the factors and underlying processes that result in the different 
types of NBMs observed here. In particular, little information has been obtained in the present 
studies on the specific reasons to revise belief in occurrence in the case of ‘Grain of Doubt’ or 
‘Weak’ NBMs. Studies that measure the characteristics of vivid memories prior to the 
development of NBMs would permit exploration of how baseline characteristics relate to 
changes in the various ratings of interest. Such studies are difficult to conduct under naturalistic 
circumstances, and thus will likely need to be performed in the laboratory. We also reiterate that 
NBMs are just one outcome that may result when the occurrence and/or accuracy of vivid 
memories are brought into question by other evidence, as other outcomes remain possible (e.g. 
defending the memory). 
The current results provide important elements for the prediction of the outcome of future 
studies examining clusters of experimentally created NBMs (such as in Clark et al, 2012;  
Mazzoni et al, 2014; Otgaar et al, 2014). For example, one could expect that ‘Classic NBMs’ are 
more likely in cases in which the plausibility of the event is challenged by others, whereas 
manipulations that question the recollective qualities of the memories could be more likely to 
result in ‘Weak NBMs’ (this could be also a way to assess whether ‘Weak NBMs’ result from 
strongly undermined memories, or from undermined memories that were already initially 
relatively vague and of poor quality), and procedures undermining objective plausibility should 
produce ‘Grain of doubt NBMs’ with low beliefs in accuracy. These results would also make it 
possible to predict that the personal realization that the event is indeed impossible (objective 
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implausibility) would produce ‘Classic NBMs’ characterized still by high ratings in memory 
accuracy, whereas social feedback (e.g. telling people that the event was impossible) would lead 
to ‘Classic NBMs’ that have also low ratings in memory accuracy. Distinguishing these sub-
types of NBMs may also be useful when developing research to identify individual difference 
factors that predict nonbelieved memories. 
Conclusions 
Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) can be conceived as a unitary counterintuitive 
phenomenon in which a person claims to have a vivid episodic recollection of an event, despite 
some reduction in belief that the recollection is veridical. However, the evidence presented here 
demonstrates that NBMs are also diverse in the extent to which belief in occurrence is 
relinquished. Different reasons determine different degrees of belief withdrawal, with event 
plausibility and social feedback about the existence and possibility of the event being the 
strongest reason to stop believing in a memory that is still vivid.  
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Table 1. Reasons for altering belief in vivid memories 
Category Description 
Social  
Told did not occur Feedback that the event did not occur, and/or others deny event. 
Told happened differently Feedback that details within the event happened differently. 
Told impossible Feedback that event could not have occurred. 
Told unlikely Feedback that the event could have occurred but it is unlikely. 
Told happened to someone else Feedback that the event (or event features) happened to someone else. 
Non-verbal feedback Intentional non-verbal feedback (e.g., look of disbelief, laughing, etc).  
Told was not there Feedback that was not present to witness event.  
Lack of corroboration Feedback provided that the memory cannot be confirmed.  
Feedback not sought/provided Does not seek feedback and others do not provide it.  
Others unavailable Does not receive feedback because key other(s) unavailable.  
Pressured by others Feedback appears motivated (memory poses consequences for other). 
Refusal to discuss Seeks feedback but other(s) refuse to provide (other may be motivated to avoid). 
Plausibility  
Subjective States event is impossible/implausible based on feelings, tastes, or opinions. 
Objective Event judged impossible/implausible for commonly accepted axioms of reality. 
Alternate attributions  
Internal, Asleep Memory may have resulted from a dream or nightmare. 
Internal, Awake Memory may have resulted from fantasy, imagination, etc. 
Other mental state Memory may have resulted from another cause (hallucination, substance, etc.). 
External Memory may have resulted from an external source (movie, T.V., book, etc.).  
General metamemorial beliefs  
Memory and age Belief memories cannot occur when very young or unreliable from childhood. 
Memory integrity Belief in memory ability, that c/b false; result from expectations, etc. 
Memory influence Belief that true memories should have an enduring influence. 
Internal  
Atypical internal characteristics Something unusual about memory (features disorganized, feels unreal, etc.). 
External evidence (non-social)  
Disconfirming evidence obtained Seeks or confronted with evidence that threatens the validity of the memory.  
Confirming evidence not obtained External evidence that validates the memory is absent or cannot be obtained. 
Notions of self/others  
(In)consistency w/self-image States event (or features) is at odds with whom they regard themselves to be. 
(In)consistency w/image of other(s) Sates event (or features) is at odds with the image they hold of other(s). 
Motivation  
Motivation to relinquish belief Motivated to stop believing confirmatory, or believe disconfirmatory evidence. 
Note: Complete details about the coding system are reported in Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni (2015). 
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Structure matrix 1 2 
Visual .41 .61 
Spatial .25 .64 
Reexperiencing .34 .47 
Rehearsal  .26 .51 
Coherence .36 .36 
Connected .19 .12 
Significance .36 .04 
Personal plausibility .78 -.54 
Function at group centroids 1 2 
Cluster 1 (Weak) -.16 .67 
Cluster 2 (Classic) -.72 -.40 
Cluster 3 (Grain of doubt) .84 -.21 
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Table 3. Study 1, References to reasons for altering belief, by cluster. 
 
 







Grain of doubt 
NBM (n 117) 
Social Told did not occur .23 [.15,.31] .26 [.18,.35] .15 [.09,.22] 
 Told happened differently .07 [.03,.12] .12 [.07,.19] .11 [.06,.17] 
 Told impossible .06 [.03,.11] .12 [.07,.20] .12 [.06,.18] 
 Told unlikely .02 [.00,.04] .05 [.01,.09] .03 [.00,.06] 
 Told happened to someone else .03 [.00,.06] .04 [.01,.08] .03 [.00,.06] 
 Non-verbal feedback .01 [.00,.03] .00 [.00,.00] .01 [.00,.03] 
 Told was not there .00 [.00,.00] .02 [.00,.05] .03 [.00,.06] 
 Lack of corroboration .10 [.04,.15] .21 [.12,.33] .07 [.03,.12] 
 Feedback not sought/provided .01 [.00,.02]  .00 [.00,.00]  .01 [.00,.03]  
 Others unavailable .01 [.00,.03] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] 
 Pressured by others .01 [.00,.04] .01 [.00,.03] .05 [.02,.09] 
 Refusal to discuss .01 [.00,.03] .02 [.00,.05] .03 [.00,.06] 
Plausibility Subjective .37 [.28,.47] .37 [.28,.46] .21 [.14,.28] 
 Objective .09 [.04,.14] .18 [.10,.26] .15 [.09,.21] 
Alternate Internal, Asleep .12 [.06,.18] .08 [.04,.14] .09 [.03,.14] 
 Internal, Awake .21 [.13,.30] .19 [.12,.27] .15 [.09,.22] 
 Other mental state .03 [.00,.06] .03 [.00,.07] .02 [.00,.04] 
 External .02 [.00,.04] .03 [.00,.07] .03 [.01,.07] 
General belief Memory and age .07 [.03,.12] .08 [.04,.14] .15 [.09,.22] 
 Memory integrity .03 [.00,.06] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] 
 Memory influence .14 [.08,.20] .10 [.05,.14] .11 [.06,.17] 
Internal  .16 [.10,.23] .14 [.08,.21] .12 [.07,.18] 
External Disconfirming evidence obtained .08 [.03,.13] .08 [.03,.13] .10 [.05,.16] 
 Confirming evidence not obtained .04 [.01,.08] .08 [.04,.14] .07 [.03,.11] 
Notions self/other (In)consistency w/self-image .02 [.00,.04] .04 [.01,.08] .02 [.00,.04] 
 (In)consistency w/image of other(s) .13 [.07,.20] .04 [.01,.08] .04 [.01,.09] 
Motivation  .07 [.03,.12] .02 [.00,.05] .07 [.03,.12] 
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Structure matrix 1 2 
Visual .30 .65 
Spatial .38 .62 
Reexperiencing .52 .32 
Rehearsal  .20 .38 
Coherence .37 .44 
Connected .29 .29 
Significance .33 .02 
Personal plausibility .79 -.39 
Function at group centroids 1 2 
Cluster 1 (Weak) -.57 -.98 
Cluster 2 (Classic) -.45 .71 
Cluster 3 (Grain of doubt) -.75 1.12 
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Table 5. Study 2, References to reasons for altering belief, by cluster. 
 




















Social Told did not occur .33 [.23,.42] .42 [.32,.53] .28 [.13,.44] .43 [.30,.57] .46 [.34,.59] 
 Told happened differently .12 [.07,.20] .14 [.06,.21] .03 [.00,.09] .09 [.02,.18] .24 [.14,.36] 
 Told impossible .05 [.01,.11] .04 [.00,.09] .19 [.06,.34] .09 [.02,.18] .07 [.02,.15] 
 Told unlikely .01 [.00,.03] .04 [.00,.09] .06 [.00,.16] .00 [.00,.00] .07 [.02,.14] 
 Told happened to someone else .01 [.00,.03] .04 [.00,.09] .00 [.00,.00] .05 [.00,.11] .03 [.00,.08] 
 Non-verbal feedback .00 [.00,.00] .04 [.00,.09] .00 [.00,.00] .03 [.00,.08] .02 [.00,.07] 
 Told was not there .04 [.01,.09] .10 [.04,.16] .03 [.00,.09] .02 [.00,.07] .02 [.00,.05] 
 Lack of corroboration .17 [.10,.25] .15 [.07,.23] .16 [.06,.28] .07 [.00,.14] .15 [.07,.25] 
 Feedback not sought/provided .00 [.00,.00] .01 [.00,.04] .00 [.00,.00] .02 [.00,.07] .02 [.00,.07] 
 Others unavailable .03 [.00,.08] .01 [.00,.04] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] 
 Pressured by others .05 [.01,.10] .09 [.02,.16] .00 [.00,.00] .09 [.02,.18] .15 [.07,.25] 
 Refusal to discuss .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .03 [.00,.08] .00 [.00,.00] 
Plausibility Subjective .07 [.01,.12] .21 [.12,.31] .25 [.13,.41] .09 [.02,.18] .08 [.02,.15] 
 Objective .09 [.03,.14] .07 [.02,.14] .25 [.13,.41] .23 [.11,.36] .03 [.00,.08] 
Alternate Internal, Asleep .09 [.03,.15] .11 [.05,.19] .13 [.03,.25] .00 [.00,.00] .17 [.08,.27] 
 Internal, Awake .13 [.07,.21] .26 [.17,.36] .28 [.13,.44] .18 [.09,.32] .17 [.08,.27] 
 Other mental state .07 [.02,.12] .07 [.02,.14] .13 [.03,.25] .00 [.00,.00] .02 [.00,.05] 
General belief Memory and age .14 [.08,.22] .19 [.10,.27] .03 [.00,.09] .09 [.02,.18] .08 [.02,.15] 
 Memory integrity .17 [.11,.26] .17 [.10,.24] .09 [.00,.22] .11 [.04,.20] .17 [.08,.25] 
 Memory influence .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] 
Internal  .10 [.04,.16] .07 [.02,.12] .00 [.00,.00] .02 [.00,.07] .08 [.02,.17] 
External Disconfirm evidence obtained .10 [.04,.16] .07 [.02,.14] .13 [.03,.25] .11 [.02,.20] .05 [.00,.10] 
 Confirm evidence not obtained .04 [.01,.09] .05 [.01,.10] .16 [.03,.28] .05 [.00,.11] .02 [.00,.05] 
Notions self/other (In)consistency w/self-image .01 [.00,.03] .02 [.00,.06] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] .00 [.00,.00] 
 (In)consistency w/image of other(s) .09 [.03,.15] .17 [.10,.27] .06 [.00,.16] .05 [.00,.11] .05 [.00,.10] 









Figure 1. Study 1, Average belief in occurrence and recollection ratings for the three cluster solution. The numbers 
in parentheses are the Ns associated with each cluster. The error bars show 95% CIs. Belief in occurrence is 
statistically lower than recollection in all clusters. Average ratings for believed memories (BM) and believed-not-
remembered events (BNR) are provided for the purpose of comparison. 
  




Figure 2. Self-report ratings by Cluster. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The figure on the right shows 
believed memories (BM) and believed-not-remembered events (BNR) for purposes of comparison. 
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Figure 3. Study 2, Cluster analysis using belief in occurrence and recollection items. 
 
 
Note: Error bars show 95% CIs. 
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Figure 4. Study 2, Five cluster solution including belief in occurrence, recollection, and belief in 
accuracy. 
 
Note: BM – Believed memory; BNR – Believed not remembered event. C1 – Weak NBMs; C2 – Classic NBMs; C3 






Cluster 1. “Weak NBMs” 
 
 
Cluster 2. “Classic NBMs”. C2.1 is characterized  
by lower belief in accuracy ratings. 
 
Cluster 3. “Grain of doubt” NBMs. C3.2 is characterized  
by lower belief in accuracy ratings. 
 
 
Figure 5. Study 2, Memory characteristic ratings for the five NBM clusters, believed memories (BM) and believed-
not-remembered events (BNR). To facilitate clarity, the data are spread across multiple panels. Error bars show 95% 
CIs on the group means. The five clusters reflect distinct sub-groups; the ratings for believed memories (BM) and 
believed-not-remembered events (BNR) are taken across the entire sample.  
 
 
